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This study provides evidence that culture understood as values and beliefs moves very 
slowly. Despite massive institutional change, values and beliefs in transition countries 
have not changed much over the last 20 years. Evidence suggests that culture is affected 
by the long run historical past, in particular the participation in empires for over 100 
years. Current institutional evolutions in transition countries might be more affected by 
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1 Introduction 
If one were to have made in 1910 predictions about the outlook for Russia, Central Europe 
and China in 2010, what plausible scenarios could one imagine? Surprisingly, one can very 
well imagine scenarios that are very close to what we are observing today. Prediction is often 
nothing less than an extrapolation from the past. Russia was modernizing economically but 
was remaining politically very autocratic. Central Europe was economically very prosperous 
and well integrated to Western Europe but experiencing nationalistic tensions. China was 
waking up from its torpor and opening up to the outside world searching for modern 
institutions capable of unifying China, in all likelihood via a unified military command. A 
hundred years later, some of the trends one could observe in the early twentieth century can 
still be observed today. The remarkable thing is that during this century, these different 
regions of the world have all undergone several decades of living under a communist regime, 
something that in all likelihood would not have been predicted then. Seen in the very long 
run, it would seem however that these decades of communism have not left a great influence 
on the long-run trends one observes in these regions of the world. Was the communist 
experience, in the very long run, nothing else than a minor historical blip in the long-run 
evolution of these countries?1  
 
There are many traits in post-socialist countries that we tend to attribute to the recent 
communist past. However, if we take a closer look, these traits might have more to do with 
the pre-communist historical past than with the communist experience itself. Is Putin’s 
autocratic style and reliance on the secret service a communist trait or rather one that was 
associated with Russia already before the Bolshevik revolution, such as the role of the 
Okhranka and previous embodiments of the Tsar’s secret service in keeping the state 
apparatus together? We know that communist ideology is mostly only a façade for the 
Chinese communist party and that it is more driven by the nationalistic ideals of Sun Yat-sen, 
the Kuomintang leader in 1909 than by the ideas of Karl Marx. The organization of the 
Chinese bureaucracy, its meritocratic system, even the moralizing campaigns have less to do 
with ‘democratic centralism’ and communist ideology than with the millennial mandarinal 
system that was relatively efficient most of the time throughout Chinese history. While it is 
very difficult to precisely disentangle the effects of communism versus those of long-run 
history, it would definitely be wrong to ignore the weight of long-run history. 
 
In this study, I take a closer look at the weight of long-run history in the observed evolution 
of post-socialist countries and try to understand if past history really seems to influence these 
evolutions possibly more than the recent communist past, and why this might be the case. I 
start with a quite speculative, though in my view illuminating, exercise consisting in 
extrapolating the future of Russia, Central Europe and China from the perspective of 1909. 
We then provide some hard empirical evidence in showing the role of long-run history in 
shaping cultural values in Eastern and Central Europe. This evidence tends to show that 
culture, that is values and beliefs, moves very slowly and thus that the distant past affects 
countries historical path via their culture. We then look at the evolution of beliefs in transition 
countries since the beginning of the transition. While these countries have undergone massive 
institutional change, it is surprising to see how sticky values and beliefs have been in the last 
                                                 
1 Four to seven decades are long in people’s lives but short in a historical perspective.   2
twenty years. We argue in the final section that the long-run stickiness of values and belief is 
a major determinant of the institutional and economic evolution of countries. 
2  The future of Russia, China and Central Europe seen from the perspective of 1909.  
Economics is predictably bad at making predictions, let alone long-run predictions. People 
however cannot resist the temptation to make or try to make predictions, however shaky the 
foundations. In this section, I propose the following thought experiment. Assume we were in 
1910 and did not know any of the history of the next hundred years. Assume one would want 
to make predictions about how Russia, Central Europe and China would look like hundred 
years onwards. What would the picture look like? This thought experiment must obviously be 
taken with a grain of salt because we are not operating behind a veil of ignorance. Moreover, 
such long-run predictions do not have a scientific basis and are generally nothing more than 
loose interpolations from the past. I will not pretend to do more. All I want is to produce 
some ‘makeshift predictions’ using interpolation that seem plausible from the perspective of 
1910. Since it would have been very difficult to predict then that all these countries would 
spend a great part of the twentieth century under a communist-imposed socialist economy 
and since all these countries have since abandoned socialism, it is useful to see how far such 
simple interpolations could bring us in understanding where these countries are today. If this 
is the case, this would mean that we can understand much about those countries based on 
their long-run past. This thought experiment does not prove anything by itself. However, in 
the next section we will bring some evidence to bear on the weight of history. 
 
Let us start with Russia. One could imagine in 1909 that Russia would continue its economic 
modernization process that started at the turn of the century under Count Witte and continued 
vigorously under Prime Minister Stolypin’s reforms. Industrialization was encouraged and 
there was rapid expansion of the steel, industry, oil industry and the rapid construction of a 
large network of railroads. The agrarian reforms started under Stolypin included the 
development of solid private property of land in the countryside, lines of credit for private 
farmers, dissemination of methods of land improvement. Peasants were encouraged via the 
Trans-Siberian railroad to migrate east and take land in Siberia. Russia could have been 
predicted to have partly caught up with Western Europe (see Miller 1927 for a description of 
pre-1914 Russia). However, given the size of the country, modern industry was concentrated 
in a few rich urban centres like St. Petersburg, Moscow, Kiev, Kharkov, Vilna and Riga 
(Hooson 1968). Simultaneously, there remained huge pockets of rural and backward poverty 
since serfdom had only recently been abolished and peasants were living under forms of 
communal ownership. The strong growth in heavy industry relied a lot on foreign investment 
and Western technical assistance. To pay for all this, the Russian economy of the early 
twentieth century could rely on the export of energy, natural resources and especially 
agricultural products. 
 
Since its rebirth under both Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great, the Russian state was very 
centralized and relied on a strong repressive apparatus to ruthlessly quell any dissent. In the 
early twentieth century, the famous Okhranka secret police was quite skilled and efficient in 
chasing anarchists and revolutionaries of all kinds. In their efforts to build a secret 
organization that could protect them efficiently against the secret police, the Bolsheviks were 
able to create an organization that would allow them to seize and keep power in Russia in 
1917.  
   3
Throughout the nineteenth century, Russia had been pushing its territory westwards, taking 
advantage of the weakening of the Ottoman Empire to gain influence and acquire territory in 
areas formerly controlled by the Ottoman Empire. This explains the push in the Balkans and 
in the Caucasus. Russia did not have good access to seas at its western borders. It could push 
geopolitically either in the northwest in the Baltics or in the Southwest by getting access to 
the Mediterranean via the Balkans. Under Tsar Nicolas II, both directions were tried without 
enough focus on either.  
 
So, if we would extrapolate from 1909 over the next hundred years the observed tendencies 
in terms of economic fundamentals, broad institutional characteristics and geopolitical 
outlook, what could we reasonably expect? A ‘reasonable’ prediction would be that Russia 
would continue its economic modernization, possibly catch up, at least partly with the other 
industrialized nations. There would nevertheless remain large discrepancies between the 
more developed urban centres and a large backward countryside with huge pockets of 
poverty. Russia’s comparative advantage would remain in the export of natural resources and 
raw materials. The political regime would be a Republic or a constitutional monarchy with 
strong centralized powers and an ever-present strong secret police. One could reasonably 
predict that Russia would have a stronger geopolitical role, possibly with a strong presence in 
the Balkans and in former areas of the Ottoman Empire, but probably less in the Baltics and 
to the east of Prussian Germany. This would have seemed rational at the time given the rapid 
modernization of Germany and its strong military build-up. 2 
 
This picture would seem very much to describe, with broad brushstrokes, Russia in 2010. 
Russia has industrialized strongly but this was under central planning. There are large 
discrepancies between the bigger richer urban centres and a poor countryside. The 
countryside was killed by collectivization and was never really able to recover despite the 
privatization drives of the 1990s. Transition in Russian agriculture is a sad story of failures 
and badly co-ordinated reforms. In 1910, one would have most likely overestimated the state 
of Russian agriculture in 2010 as well as the extent of its strength in Russian exports. Russia 
is a republic with centralized powers and the secret service is still the backbone of the state 
apparatus. When rebuilding the Russian state on the ashes of the disorganized bureaucracy of 
the Yeltsin years, Putin built directly on his former KGB network, making it possible to 
weaken the oligarchs and strengthen the power of the siloviki. Geopolitically, it is not clear 
whether Russia is more powerful in relative terms compared to the early twentieth century 
given its strong decline since the end of the Cold War. It has suffered major losses in territory 
after the breakup of the Soviet Union. Its power in Western Europe is lower than what it was 
hundred years ago and it is having a hard time dealing with local conflict in Chechnya and in 
the Caucasus. Post-Yeltsin Russia appears more powerful internationally than under Yeltsin 
but it does not fare much better than under the extraordinary lows of the 1990s when it 
seemed that Russian policy could be directly influenced by Washington. 
 
Let us now turn to Central Europe. It is in a way more difficult to draw a consistent picture 
because the perspective might seem different seen from Budapest, Warsaw, or Prague. We 
will therefore take even more of a bird’s eye view. In 1909, Central Europe was economically 
very prosperous and integrated to the world economy. Berlin, Prague, Vienna, Budapest were 
on equal terms large centres of culture, trade, and economic growth. This large economic 
                                                 
2 Nicolas II did not make such a choice and focused equally on the Balkans and the Baltic. With hindsight, this 
seems to have been a mistake of historical consequences since the German push to the east in World War I 
eventually led to the downfall of the tsarist regime.    4
prosperity contrasted with the archaic political institutions governing most of Central Europe. 
The Austro-Hungarian Empire was governed by a weak, conservative and rigid multi-ethnic 
bureaucracy that was neither admired nor respected. The German Empire had a more efficient 
state apparatus but was being challenged from inside by a strong workers’ movement fighting 
for democracy and universal suffrage. Geopolitically, nationalism was boiling everywhere, a 
trend that had started in the nineteenth century with the revolutionary uprisings of 1830 in 
Poland and in 1848 throughout most Europe. Nationalism associated with aspirations for 
more modern political institutions was making the Austro-Hungarian Empire burst at its 
seams and appear more and more weak and dysfunctional, its army appearing weaker than 
the Russian Army. Many territories under the control of the Austro-Hungarian Empire could 
thus appear to be a possible prey for Russian westward expansionism building on Pan-Slavic 
movements from Slovakia to Serbia.  
 
If we extrapolate from 1910, one would reasonably expect Central Europe to remain 
economically very prosperous and integrated to a German and Czech economic powerhouse.3 
Institutionally, one would predict that the empires would be replaced with more modern 
republican and democratic institutions. The advent of nationalist democratic movements 
would however lead to a breakup of the multi-ethnic Austro-Hungarian Empire. The borders 
of a future Central Europe would however seem very hard to predict in 1909. One possibility 
is that of a merger between Austria and Germany. To recall, this merger had failed in the 
nineteenth century since the establishment of the Zollverein because the conservative 
Austrian monarchy was afraid the unified country would be governed by progressive forces 
(Dumke 1978). Another possibility is that of a very powerful Hungary being the big power in 
Central Europe and controlling large parts of Slovakia and Romania. It was uncertain whether 
Poland would gain independence, possibly creating a joint state with a greater Lithuania 
following the dreams of Pilsudski. 
 
Overall, if we compare these plausible predictions with the reality of 2009, Central Europe 
probably looks today less prosperous than what might have been predicted in 1910. Of 
course, four decades of socialism are much to blame for this. Nevertheless, in the nineties, 
observers tended to marvel at how Central Europe was faring better under transition than in 
the former Soviet Union (FSU) and different explanations were put forward for that ‘Great 
Divide’ (see for example, Berglöf and Bolton 2002). In historical perspective, Central Europe 
lost many decades of prosperity when it was chained to the Soviet Empire. Politically, all 
Central European countries have become democracies like in Western Europe, albeit 
somewhat less stable for reasons we will discuss in section 4 of this study. Nevertheless, this 
appears to be a clean break from the situation of 1910. Geopolitically, Central Europe appears 
more fragmented than it might have been predicted to be. This fragmentation, established 
after World War I under the Wilsonian influence, would appear potentially very unstable 
given the many possible border conflicts and historical claims of some countries over 
territories of other countries. Nevertheless, the European Union (EU) has brought great 
stability to the borders of Central Europe by integrating these countries within the Union. 
Without the existence of the EU, the breaking away of Central Europe from the Soviet Union 
after 1989 would certainly have exacerbated local nationalisms and nationalist conflicts 
between Hungary, Slovakia and Romania, to give just one example.  
 
                                                 
3 The Czech lands of Bohemia and Moravia were among the most prosperous regions of Europe until World 
War II.    5
Let us now turn to China. Early in the twentieth century, the Qing dynasty seemed moribund. 
The opium wars had forced China to cede territories to the British and to allow them to sell 
opium within China. Various colonizing countries were looking forward to sharing the spoils 
of the declining Chinese Empire. Internal revolts were further weakening the Celestial 
Empire. The Boxer revolt had shaken all of China only a few decades after the Taiping revolt. 
A more structured nationalist and republican movement, the Kuomintang was expanding fast 
under the leadership of Sun Yat-sen, a foreign-educated Westernizing intellectual who 
aspired to make China strong again by modernizing its institutions and reviving its economy 
which had been the most affluent in the world until the eighteenth century.  
 
Seen from the perspective of 1910, a plausible scenario would be that Sun Yat-sen would 
succeed and win his gamble of modernizing China. China could then be seen hundred years 
down the road as a nationalist republic, plausibly with military characteristics.4 The south of 
China could be seen to play a much larger role in the country in the future. Sun Yat-sen 
himself was from Guangzhou province and he spent several years in Hong Kong. The larger 
area surrounding the Pearl River delta had never played any major role in Chinese history but 
it was expanding very fast as a major locus of trade and commerce. Many of the supporters of 
Sun Yat-sen also came from that region.  
 
Given its past traditions, China could be seen to become a major player in the world’s exports 
of agricultural goods as well as of agriculture-intensive products, light industry and 
manufacturing with foreign trade being a major source of its economic revival. Compared to 
China in 2010, this extrapolation would seem pretty much on target. China has become a 
major powerhouse in the world economy due to its vigorous export of light manufacturing 
goods. Southern China and the coastal regions have played a major role in China’s economic 
revival and its participation in world trade. China has got rid of the colonizing powers and 
taken back Hong Kong and Macau from the British and the Portuguese. It has been unified 
under a nationalist dictatorship with strong domestic military powers. The only difference is 
that the revival of the Chinese continent has happened not under the auspices of the 
Kuomintang but under those of the Chinese Communist Party, after many detours: an internal 
civil war, Japanese occupation, the Communist victory, and the disastrous Maoist years of the 
Great Leap forward and the Cultural Revolution. It is only in the last 32 years before 2010 
that China started its economic revival. The Communist Party today looks however closer to 
a nationalist Kuomintang than to the ideologically fanatical organization that Mao had built 
between the 1920s and the Cultural Revolution. Today’s China seems also closer than ever to 
Sun Yat-sen’s goals of a slowly emerging democracy even though the goal of democracy is 
not shared by the communist leadership and one has reasons to doubt that democracy will be 
established in China for quite many decades, if only because democracy could jeopardize the 
unity of China and reinforce secessionist tendencies in various provinces.  
 
What should we conclude from this thought experiment comparing possible extrapolations 
from 1910 to 2010 for Russia, Central Europe and China? The picture that emerges based 
purely on the reality of 1910 seems very close in many aspects to today’s reality in those 
regions. Interestingly, if we had made a prediction for 1960 instead which would probably 
have looked very similar, we would have been wildly wrong. The difference is that all these 
countries became socialist economies in the decades after 1910 and socialism as an economic 
                                                 
4 Sun Yat-sen was in favour of democracy but unifying China was his first goal. Towards that goal, he was in 
favour of a temporary military dictatorship in order to unify China and prepare it in the longer run for 
democracy.   6
system had all but disappeared by 2010, apart from North Korea and Cuba. It might thus 
seem that communism was a giant historical detour and that by 2010 most countries had at 
least partially recovered from that detour and gone back to the long-run trends of 1910. 
Thinking of these long-run trends, it seems that the geopolitical evolution is more uncertain 
than the long-run economic trends and basic domestic political institutional evolution. This is 
more true for Central Europe which given its ethnic diversity could have evolved in many 
different directions. At the margin, the borders of Russia would not have easily been 
predicted either. The loss of Ukraine in particular following the breakup of the Soviet Union 
would certainly have seemed like a low probability event. China appears to be an exception 
but it has had exceptional stability of its borders over the last centuries.  
 
The natural endowments and geography of a country play a big role in shaping its 
comparative advantage together with its history. Some of the economic fundamentals would 
thus appear to be quite stable. None of these regions has been underdeveloped for all their 
history and thus they could count on accumulated human capital to grow.  
 
The ‘predictions’ for the domestic political institutions are generally on target. Long-run 
trends thus seem to be discernible. Why could that be? A hypothesis that comes to mind is 
that there is some co-evolution of formal institutions and of a country’s culture seen as the 
general set of values and beliefs about how the world works. Central Europe has a shared 
culture with Western Europe. It went through the Enlightenment period in which the modern 
culture that has shaped democratic institutions has emerged out of the ashes of the Dark 
Ages. Therefore, one could have thought that there would be in the long run historical 
convergence with institutions of Western Europe. This is happening despite some caveats to 
which we will come later. Russia in contrast missed the Enlightenment as it was living under 
Tatar rule. Modernization, be it under Peter the Great, Empress Catherine, or Stalin happened 
under an original mix of violence and centralized repression on one hand and aspiration 
towards Western-inspired values on the other hand, all in a sea of territorial immensity and 
large backwardness. The traces of this mix are very palpable in today’s Russia. China has 
developed a civilization of its own with a Confucianist culture, a meritocratic and efficient 
system of administration with an obsession for political stability and a fear of heterogeneity. 
There is no place here to describe in detail the effects of Confucianist culture but there is no 
doubt that they are present in today’s China, even if they co-exist with the legacy of the 
Cultural Revolution. How can we understand this long-run co-evolution of institutions and 
culture? Why is the weight of history so large despite the incredible historical detour given by 
the failed experiment of creating a socialist system? Before understanding this, it is useful to 
go beyond the impressionistic and speculative reasoning we have provided so far. 
3  The weight of long-run history versus the communist past 
Very intriguing empirical evidence exists to show that the weight of long-run history matters 
significantly in transition countries. Grosjean (2009) has used the Life in Transition Survey 
(LITS) conducted in 2006 by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and 
the World Bank in 28 post-transition countries and in Turkey in order to analyze the deter 
minants of cultural distance using a gravity model. The data include 21,000 households in 
1,050 primary sampling units. Since the location of the surveys is known, she was able to 
build various distance measures based on all pairs of locations.  
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The basic specification regresses the distance between a pair of locations for a cultural 
variable against physical distance, taking into account the presence of mountains, as well as 
other distance measures and other variables. The other distance measures are (1) the 
dissimilarity in composition of social classes as measured by the proportion of rich, poor and 
middle income; (2) dissimilarity in educational achievement; and (3) dissimilarity in the 
composition of the main religions (Muslim, Christian, Jewish, atheist, and other). The 
regression includes location fixed effects as well as a dummy variable for whether the two 
localities are in the same country, a dummy variable for whether two localities belong to 
different but adjacent countries as well as a dummy for whether the two locations belonged to 
the same empire in the past for at least 100 years. The relevant empires are the Ottoman, the 
Austro-Hungarian, the Russian, and the Prussian. Given that borders of empires and countries 
have moved a lot across time, there is rich variation in the data. 
 
The cultural dependent variable used is the question about ‘generalized trust’ that is also 
present in the World Values Surveys: ‘Generally speaking, would you say that most people 
can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?’ Grosjean also looks at 
the distance between occupational compositions using the following categories: white collar, 
blue collar, service worker, farmer, farm worker, unemployed, housewife, pensioner, student. 
Interestingly, she finds that two locations that belonged to the same empire in the past tend to 
have a smaller cultural distance. However, belonging to the same country or to two adjacent 
countries does not have any significant effect. Having been integrated in the same empire for 
more than 100 years is the equivalent of reducing the distance between two locations by more 
than a third (367 km out of an average distance of 1,029 km in the sample). Similar results 
are obtained when using occupational distance as a regressor. When looking at the effect of 
time being together under the same empire, the effect is only significant after 400 years under 
the same Empire but always significant for the occupational variable.  
 
These results are very interesting because they point to the long-run inertia of culture. Culture 
is transmitted vertically from parents to children and horizontally through influence from 
peers and the outside world. Physical distance reduces the possibilities of horizontal 
transmission and also channels of vertical transmission as one was less likely to marry people 
living at a further distance. The effect of living under a common empire in reducing cultural 
heterogeneity across space is however quite remarkable but this effect required several 
centuries to operate. Reduction of economic heterogeneity, as measured here by occupational 
dissimilarities, appears to require substantially less time.  
 
These findings become even more interesting and confirm the long-run inertia of culture 
when one considers the results obtained by adding to the regressions a dummy for whether 
two locations jointly belonged to the FSU or the former Yugoslavia. The results on cultural 
distance are not significant for the FSU and only marginally significant in the case of former 
Yugoslavia. There is a significant effect for occupational distance though. The effect of 
former empires generally remains strong and very significant. Moreover, the coefficients 
of former empires are much higher than those associated to the FSU or former Yugoslavia. A 
convergent finding is present when looking at the effect of having entered the EU; i.e. for 
pairs of locations that have become EU territory. The effect is not significant for cultural 
distance but significant for occupational distance. The research by Grosjean on Central and 
East European (CEE) transition countries and Turkey gives very suggestive evidence of the 
weight of long-run history and the century-long effect of having lived under a common 
empire. It is quite remarkable that these effects of the long-run past come out strongly in 
regressions.    8
4 Cultural  inertia 
One can understand better cultural inertia by looking at another set of data on beliefs. The 
World Values Survey was conducted in five waves and we have data on transition countries in 
CEE between 1989 and 2005. Since CEE countries went through such large-scale institutional 
change after 1989 with a complete transformation of the economic and political system, one 
would be tempted to believe that these enormous transformations would also affect the beliefs 
and values of the populations of those countries. Moreover, given the fact that institutional 
change aimed at establishing the market and democracy, one would think that these changes 
would bring values and beliefs closer to those of populations of advanced democracies and 
market economies. Surprisingly, none of these hypotheses turns out to be verified. There is a 
specific set of values and beliefs that existed in these countries prior to the transition process 
that has hardly changed. It is characterized in particular by a more authoritarian view of 
government and a preference for a larger responsibility of government in the economy. 
Moreover, these values and beliefs do not appear to have converged towards those existing in 
advanced democracies and market economies, be it the EU-15 (countries that were members of 
the EU before the admission of Central European countries) or the USA. We give a few 
illustrative examples below.  
 
In Figure 1, we can see the evolution of attitudes towards public and private ownership in the 
economy. Two opposing views are formulated ‘Private ownership of business and industry 
should be increased’, and ‘Government ownership of business and industry should be 
increased’, with higher scores meaning support for the latter proposition and lower scores 
support for the former. It appears quite clearly that support for public ownership is strongly 
higher in transition countries relative to the EU-15 or the USA. Moreover, support for public 
ownership has increased and not decreased since the beginning of the transition process. 
 
Figure 1 
Public ownership should be increased 
 
 
Source: World Values Survey. 
 
Figure 2 looks at attitudes towards competition in the economy. The answers refer to a 
question stating either ‘Competition is good. It stimulates people to work hard and develop   9
new ideas’, or ‘Competition is harmful. It brings out the worst in people’. A high score means 
agreement with the latter whereas a low score means agreement with the former. As we see, a 
negative attitude towards competition is higher among EU-15 countries than among transition 
countries, the USA having the most positive attitude. Note however that since 1989, views on 
competition in transition countries have become more negative, not more positive.  
 
Figure 2 
Competition is harmful 
 
Source: World Values Survey. 
 
Figure 3 shows the answer to whether nationals should have more right to a job in case of 
unemployment. The question was ‘When jobs are scarce, employers should give priority to 
nationals over immigrants’. A higher score meant agreement with this proposition. As we can 
see, there is more agreement to this discriminatory proposition in transition countries 
compared to the EU-15 or the USA.5 Moreover, positions have not changed very much in the 
last 20 years. There are even less signs of convergence. 
Figure 3 
 
Source: World Values Survey. 
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In Figure 4, we see the answer to a similar question about reserving jobs for men relative to 
women in case of scarcity. Here again, the agreement on the discriminatory proposition is 
quite a bit higher for transition countries compared to the EU-15 or to the USA. The 
agreement with this proposition tends to decrease over time. However, this is also the case in 
the EU-15 and the USA.  
Figure 4 
Jobs first to men over women 
 
Source: World Values Survey 
 
Figure 5 gives answers to a similar question about the job market. This time, agreement is 
measured with the following proposition: ‘When jobs are scarce older people should be 
forced to retire from work early’. Agreement is highest in transition countries and lowest in 
the USA.  
Figure 5 
Unemployment: older people should retire early 
 
Source: World Values Survey 
 
While the previous questions were about whether there should or should not be 
discrimination on the job market, Figure 6 measures disagreement with the following 
proposition: ‘Hard work doesn’t generally bring success, it’s more a matter of luck’. This 
question refers to a fundamental belief about the respective roles of effort versus luck in 
explaining success. As one can see from Figure 6, this belief is the strongest in the USA and 
is lower in transition countries and in the EU-15. Note however that in transition countries 
belief in effort appears to have declined since the transition. 
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Figure 6 
Success due to hard work, not luck 
 
Source: World Values Survey. 
 
Figure 7 displays attitudes on an important value, the importance of imagination as a quality 
for a child. This value can be interpreted in different ways. It can be interpreted as valuing 
creativity as a product of imagination nurtured in children but it could also be interpreted as 
valuing the freedom of thought. Here we see that this value is considerably less important in 
transition countries compared to the EU and the US though some progress can be observed in 
2005 but the difference remains quite large. 
Figure 7 
Imagination is an important child quality 
 
Source: World Values Survey. 
 
The next figures illustrate beliefs on government. In Figure 8, we display support for the idea 
that order is the fundamental goal of government. As one can see, there is more support in 
transition countries compared to the EU and the USA suggesting that authoritarian values on 
the role of government are stronger in transition countries.  
 
This is confirmed in answers to the following questions. In Figure 9 we see that support for 
democracy is less strong in transition countries than in the EU or the USA. Figure 10 gives 
answers to the following question ‘Having experts, not government, make decisions 
according to what they think is best for the country’. A higher score means agreement with 
this proposition that lends support to technocratic rather than representative government. We 
see clearly that agreement is higher in transition countries than in the USA or in the EU-15.   12
Figure 11 displays support for the following proposal: ‘Having a strong leader who does not 
have to bother with parliament and elections’. As can be seen from Figure11, support for 
authoritarian government is higher in transition countries and it has even tended to increase. 
Overall, the last four figures tend to show that values in transition countries are more in 
favour of authoritarian government than in the EU-15 or in the USA.  
Figure 8 
Order fundamental goal of government 
 
Source: World Values Survey. 
Figure 9 
Having a democratic political system is good 
 
Source: World Value Surveys. 
 
Figure 10 
Having experts rather than government making decisions is good 
 
Source: World Value Surveys.   13
Figure 11 
Having a strong authoritarian leader is good 
 
Source: World Values Survey. 
 
These data do convey both specific values and beliefs in transition countries as well as inertia 
of these values despite the massive changes that have been taking place in these countries 
since 1989. If we put these questions together6 and measure as we do in Figure 12 on the 
horizontal axis values that favour more government interventionism either in the form of 
more discrimination, less competition or more public ownership and on the vertical axis 
higher support for authoritarianism, what do we get? Figure 12 shows a surprising inertia of 
values in the three groups of countries. In the USA, values have been consistently in favour 
of less economic interventionism and against authoritarianism. In the EU-15, support for 
economic intervention of government is somewhat higher but values are also relatively anti-
authoritarian. In transition countries however, there is consistently more support for 
authoritarianism and economic intervention of government. The inertia in values is quite 
remarkable. Also remarkable is that the distance between these three groups of countries is 
much larger than the distance between values in any group of countries over time. 
Figure 12 
Inertia in economic and political values 
 
Source: World Values Survey. 
                                                 
6 We also add on the economic interventionism index disagreement with the idea that inequality is needed for 
incentives. Note that answers to that question do not differ substantially across the three country groups.    14
 
One might think that Central European countries have values that are closer to the EU-15 as 
compared to Eastern European countries. This is not the case. The EBRD 2007 report which 
contains findings on the Life in Transition survey (LITs) does not show a ‘Great Divide’ in 
values between Central Europe and FSU countries. While Central European countries have 
somewhat less authoritarian views than in FSU countries, these are still closer to the latter 
than to the EU-15. The rapid institutional change that led Central European transition 
countries to become new member states of the EU has hidden the fact that values in those 
countries remain more authoritarian and nationalistic viewing the government more as a 
repressive law and order machine. One should not forget that despite the economic prosperity 
of Central Europe before World War I, those countries for the most part never really had 
experience of democracy before 1989. One can thus predict that there will be for quite some 
time a tension between values and beliefs in those countries and the EU-style institutions that 
were adopted. These tensions have already started to appear with strong nationalistic 
tendencies and signs of political instability in Central Europe after their entry into the EU. 
5  The long-run evolution of institutions  
Let us step back and try to provide a conceptual framework to understand the basic facts we 
have uncovered and highlighted in this study. The post-communist world is a fascinating 
subject to improve our understanding of institutions and their long run evolution. Three 
regions of the world with a very distinct history (Russia, Central Europe, and China) were 
deeply transformed economically and institutionally in the twentieth century following the 
beliefs of communist ideology. The communist experiment proved to be a failure and these 
regions underwent another transformation to replace the socialist economic system with 
capitalism. The institutions that have emerged from the transition however turned out to be 
very different in these three regions and do not seem to converge in any way. The long-run 
institutional evolution in these regions seems to follow a long-run path that is very much 
shaped by a country’s long-run history. In contrast, the recent history of communism does not 
seem to leave as many traces as the long-run history. Seen another way, if communism was 
the sole determinant of post-transition evolutions, the divergence between these groups of 
countries would not be as strong as observed. 
 
An important clue to understanding this is the cultural inertia that we have documented in the 
previous section. In Roland (2004), I have argued that culture is a ‘slow-moving’ institution 
in contrast with ‘fast-moving’ institutions. Slow-moving institutions generally change slowly, 
incrementally and continuously, whereas fast-moving institutions are more given to rapid, 
discontinuous change in large steps. Political institutions, for example, have the potential for 
centralized decisional changes in large steps. In this sense, they can be fast-moving 
institutions, which change nearly overnight when there are revolutionary moments. In 
contrast, social norms are more often an example of slow-moving institutions. While some 
social norms and values can change very rapidly in historical terms (e.g., a society’s tolerance 
for cigarettes), in general, social norms and values change slowly. Even individual social 
norms, such as attitudes towards the death penalty or acceptance of corruption, tend to change 
rather slowly, possibly because many norms are rooted in religions whose basic precepts have 
changed remarkably little for centuries and even millennia—the major world religions have 
shaped and still shape the basic values and preferences of individuals, what they consider 
important in life, and how they expect other people to behave toward them. One can always   15
find examples to the contrary, but values and social norms, seen as a whole, tend to change 
slowly.  
 
One important reason why culture changes slowly is that many of the beliefs that comprise 
culture are hard to refute. Metaphysical beliefs are hard to refute but so are many beliefs 
about human behaviour and society. We know as social scientists that applying scientific 
methods to social science is more difficult than applying them to natural sciences. The 
obvious reason is that in contrast to natural sciences, in social sciences in many if not most 
cases it is difficult to conduct controlled experiments. Moreover, most people do not apply 
scientific reasoning in their everyday life and tend to follow the beliefs inculcated to them by 
their parents and environment. The important inertia of culture means that culture must be 
seen as an important determinant of other institutions in society such as legal and political 
institutions. It means that trying to transplant legal and political institutions that are alien to a 
local culture can only be self-defeating. 
 
Why do we observe different long-term cultural evolutions in different regions of the world? 
Cultural evolution should be seen as a combination of autonomous and random emergence of 
belief systems. Catholicism emerged and became the official religion of the Roman Empire. 
It is often claimed that Catholicism was chosen because its universalism was favourable to 
cement the unity of the Roman Empire. According to the classic analysis of Gibbon (1776) 
however, Christianity was the main cause of the decline of the Roman Empire with its 
emphasis on chastity, otherworldliness and sectarian attitude towards other religions. 
Confucianism was first banned when China was unified, as the first Emperor Qin Shi Huang 
Di had the books of Confucianist scholars burned and Confucianist scholars executed. It was 
only in the Han dynasty that Confucianism became an official religion (or belief system) and 
has had a lasting influence ever since. The adoption of Confucianism with its insistence on 
social norms and limited and wise government stood in contrast with legalism, the doctrine 
established under the earlier Qin dynasty which justified autocratic rule and subordination to 
the emperor. However, we can imagine that another doctrine other than Confucianism could 
have emerged instead. The point is that systems of beliefs such as Christianity or 
Confucianism emerged in a way difficult to explain but once they were adopted as state 
religions of systems of beliefs, they had a lasting influence as they shaped the view of the 
world of citizens living under those empires and started having a life of their own and 
persisting long after these empires had disappeared, as is the obvious case for the Roman 
Empire. It is possible that certain systems of beliefs have a better quality of survival and 
transmission than others. This is a topic that is yet clearly not well understood.  
6 Conclusions 
The transition process from socialism to capitalism has been seen as the elimination of the 
planned economy and the communist political regime, and its replacement with a well-
functioning market economy and democratic political institutions. Twenty years after the fall 
of the Berlin Wall, it appears that the transitions have been very diverse. While Central 
European countries have embraced democracy and entered the EU, China has not and has 
instead strengthened the power of the Communist Party. Russia and many other countries 
from the FSU have evolved as states with strong autocratic tendencies. While central 
planning was abandoned everywhere, the economic institutions emerging in the different 
countries are also quite diverse, reflecting the diversity in political transitions. We have 
argued in this study that these evolutions are easily understood in the light of the long-term   16
historical evolutions of transition countries and their long-run history. In other words, they 
are best explained by the weight of long-run history arguably more than by the long-run 
weight of communism. We have argued that this long-run weight of history can be explained 
by the inertia of culture understood as the general system of beliefs and values existing in a 
society. Empirical evidence shows that having lived together in an empire, be it Austro-
Hungarian, Russian or Ottoman, explains cultural closeness between locations. We have also 
shown that values in CEE on a two-dimensional axis measuring preferences for political 
authoritarianism versus democracy and preferences for economic interventionism versus 
laissez-faire have remained consistently different for EU countries and the USA and have 
shown no sign of convergence but rather signs of divergence, illustrating the long-run inertia 
of culture.  
 
Acknowledging and understanding countries’ long-run cultural inertia as well as its influence 
on political and economic institutions is important for various important reasons. First of all, 
it helps in forming realistic expectations of future reforms in a country as well as the direction 
of reforms. Developing non-realistic expectations of short- and medium-run evolutions of 
countries is not very helpful for international collaboration with these countries. Second, one 
must precisely learn to coexist and collaborate with countries having different sets of core 
values and beliefs in a spirit of openness, tolerance and respect. Keeping openness not only to 
trade but also to other ideas, values and beliefs is the best one can do to facilitate cultural 
exchange. Cultural exchange will not lead to cultural convergence as culture moves too 
slowly but it will favour cultural evolution in a positive direction. Most importantly, it will 
create the basis for collaboration between national elites to jointly work towards the goals of 
peace, prosperity and a sustainable environment on our planet. 
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